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Procedure-Waiver of Special Appearance-Effect
Civil Procedure

of Rules of

Petitioners brought a mandamus proceeding to compel rescission
of an order closing a public school. Process was issued pursuant
to Rule 4 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents appeared specially to challenge the jurisdiction of the
court. The court overruled the objection and ordered the parties
to proceed with the taking of testimony. A writ of mandamus
was awarded. Held, reversed. The West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure do not apply to mandamus proceedings. Failure to
comply with the statutory procedure for commencing a mandamus
proceeding rendered the process utterly void. Respondents did
not waive the objection made by the special appearance by obeying
the court order to proceed with the taking of testimony. Duncan
v. Tucker County Bd. of Educ., 140 S.E.2d 613 (W.Va. 1965).
Under prior practice in West Virginia some confusion existed as
to whether objections raised by a special appearance were waived
by a subsequent general appearance. It was clear, however, that
a general appearance as the initial step constituted a waiver. Carlin,
A Decade Of Pleading,Practice And Procedure, 53 W. VA. L. REv.
1, 4 (1950). In the principal case the court acknowledged the confusion in prior decisions but limited its holding to the particular
facts involved. The court intimated that an objection to process,
raised by a special appearance, would be waived by a subsequent
general appearance if the process were "merely defective." If the
process were "void" no waiver occurred.
In Stone v. Rudolph, 127 W. Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944),
process was forwarded by the state auditor to the wife of D's
manager at D's place of business in West Virginia. D appeared
specially and contended that process was not served on him in
compliance with the Non-Resident Motorist's Act. D's motion was
denied, and he subsequently made a general appearance on the
merits. On the theory that the purpose of process is to bring D
into court and to give him notice of the proceeding, the court held
that D had waived his objection. The court stated that while D
may appear specially to attack the defect, he cannot afterwards
appear generally without waiving his objection.
In Damron v. Williamson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 109 W.Va. 122,
153 S.E. 250 (1930), D appeared specially and moved to quash
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the return of service on the ground that it contained no recital
that the secretary of the corporation, upon whom service was
made, resided in Taylor County. The motion was denied and D
thereafter made a general appearance on the merits. The court
held that the general appearance waived the objection raised by
the special appearance.
In Stone v. Rudolph, supra, the court cited Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. v. Wright, 50 W.Va. 653, 41 S.E. 147 (1902), stating that while
the case may not have been strictly applicable, the principle discussed was applicable. The Wright case was started before a
justice. D appeared specially and moved to quash the return of
service. The return did not show that the alleged agent of D, on
whom service was made, was at the time a resident of Greenbrier
County and in the actual employ of D at the time service was
made. The motion was denied, and D thereafter made a general
appearance. The court held that, under proceedings before a
justice, a defendant who appears specially to attack the service
must then elect to rely on such objection alone or waive it by going
to trial on the merits.
If the process is "merely defective," what effect will Rule 12(b),
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, have on prior decisions
which held a waiver occurred? West Virginia Rule 12(b) is
identical to the Federal Rule. LuGAR & SimvmsmN, W. VA. Ruixas
101 (1960). An examination of federal cases decided under Federal
Rule 12(b) indicates that West Virginia cases holding that any
special appearance is waived by a subsequent general appearance
shou]d no longer be persuasive under West Virginia Rule 12(b).
In Blank v. Bitker, 135 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1943), P sued to recover on a guaranty. The action was started in Illinois, and process
was served on D at his residence in Wisconsin. D took P's deposition and received four extensions of time in which to answer. In
his answer D set up defenses to the merits as well as the defenses
of lack of jurisdiction over the person and improper venue. P
contended that taking a deposition and answering constituted a
waiver of venue. Acknowledging that a general appearance would
have caused a waiver of venue prior to the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that a special appearance to
challenge the court's jurisdiction over the person and to object to
improper venue was no longer necessary. Under the rules, defenses
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to the merits may be joined with defenses of lack of jurisdiction
over the person and improper venue without a waiver.
In Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Rolaff, 110 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1940), D
appeared specially and raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person. D moved to quash the service on the ground that
it was not doing business in Missouri and even if it were, the
cause of action arose in Wisconsin. The motion was denied, and D
thereafter made a general appearance. P contended that the general appearance waived the objection raised in the special appearance. The court held that there was no waiver and stated that,
under the Federal Rules, D could have combined his objection with
defenses to the merits. In the event of an adverse decision, the
right to raise the question of jurisdiction on appeal was preserved.
Accord, Speir v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F. Supp. 436 (D. Md.
1960).
The Florida court has adopted the federal approach. In State
ex rel. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Shields, 83 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1955), D made
a special appearance and raised the defenses of lack of jurisdiction
over the person, insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service
of process. D contended that it was not doing business in Florida
and that the person upon whom the sheriff purported to serve
process was not authorized by law to be so served. The motion
was denied, and D filed a suggestion for a writ of' prohibition to
stay the proceedings. D feared that the defenses raised would be
waived by a subsequent general appearance. The court admitted
that D's fear was supported by prior case law. But since those
decisions Florida had adopted a rule based on Rule 12(b) of the
Federal Rules. The court pointed out that there was no waiver
under federal practice and specifically held that the practice was
now the same in Florida.
If West Virginia follows the federal practice under Rule 12(b)
and the reasoning of the Florida court, a defendant would be
allowed to make a special appearance and, losing thereon, make
his defense on the merits without waiving the defenses raised by
the special appearance. This conclusion would appear to be valid
whether the process was considered "void" or "merely defective."
Robert Larry Sarber
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Income Tax-Alimony Pursuant to an Invalid Divorce
P, the petitioner, and W, his first wife, entered into a separation
agreement in 1946 which provided for alimony payments to W.
Six years later P obtained a Mexican divorce and married his second wife. In New York, the matrimonial domicile of P and W, the
Mexican divorce was held invalid. P made periodic alimony payments to W and deducted them for income tax purposes. However, based on the invalidity of the Mexican divorce the Tax
Court disallowed P's deduction. Held, reversed. The payments
were made in discharge of a legal obligation incurred by P in the
1946 separation agreement which was incident to the Mexican
divorce. Such payments are deductible. Borax v. Commissioner,
349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965).
In a very broad sense the problem in the principal case is concerned with "income splitting." The term income splitting usually
brings to mind a husband splitting his income in half with his wife;
however, as a broad concept there are kinds of income splitting
devices which involve persons other than a husband and wife and
which involve proportions other than one to one. The essential
factor is that the earnings of one person be divided for tax purposes
and taxed as though earned by more than one person.
Of course one is not free to split his income as he likes; rather,
the Code is very specific in allowing splitting only in a few situations. One of these situations is the payment of alimony incident
to a divorce. If a wife is divorced under a decree of divorce her
gross income includes periodic payments received in discharge of
a legal obligation which is imposed on the husband under the decree
or under a written instrument incident to the divorce. INT. Ri:v.
CODE OF 1954, § 71(a) 1. A husband is allowed a deduction for payments which are includible in the gross income of his wife. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 215. Therefore, if a man is validly divorced
there is no question that he can effect a kind of income splitting
with his former wife.
For years the Commissioner has quarreled about the term
"divorce" as used in the Code. Does it refer (1) merely to a valid
decree of divorce or (2) to the divorced status of persons whether
or not their decree is recognized as valid by the courts of their
matrimonial domicile?
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The dissent in the principal case poses an argument that is
difficult to answer, i.e., the plain and literal meaning appears to be
that there must be either (1) a separation under a decree of
divorce, (2) a separation under a decree of separate maintenance,
(3) a separation and a written separation agreement or (4) a
separation and a decree requiring payments. INT. RBv. CODE OF
1954, § 71(a)1-3.
However, the majority of the court in the principal case relies on
a line of cases and opinions which have interpreted section 71 in
light of the social problem involved and the legislative reason for
creating the deduction. These cases and opinions, outlined below,
have been little concerned with strictly interpreting the language of
section 71. They probably have not satisfactorily answered the
objections of such dissenters as Judge Friendly in the principal case;
rather, they have defended the result obtained as socially desirable.
The most concrete basis for the view that the invalidity of the
decree is of no consequence is the House Report which accompanied passage of the Revenue Act of 1942. The legislative history
of the Revenue Bill of 1942 indicates that it was the general intent of
Congress to allow the husband to deduct alimony payments. The
House of Representatives Report said the increased taxes, brought
on mainly because of the war, would increase the husband's burden
and in many cases he would not have sufficient income to meet his
alimony and income tax obligations. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1942).
A General Counsel's Memorandum, interpreting the act in light
of the reasons for its passage concluded that the invalidity of the
divorce should have no consequence. Counsel also observed (1)
most people who get Mexican divorces do so in good faith and
rely on them in every respect, and (2) if there is a possibility of
collusive evasion involved it is rather doubtful that anyone would
go so far for tax evasion. The real basis for this Memorandum is
the House Report and a consideration of the kind of problems
Congress was attempting to solve by passing the Revenue Act of
1942. G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2 Cum. BuLL. 32.
Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952), is the
leading case concerning invalid divorces; yet it does nothing more
than rely on the General Counsels Memorandum, supra.
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Newton v. Pedrick, 212 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1954), concerns a
related problem, i.e., whether certain alimony payments were incident to a divorce. The court said that the Code contemplated
a "divorce status" rather than a strictly valid decree as interpreted
by the courts of the marital domicile.
In 1954 Congress liberalized the requirements for deducting
alimony payments by providing for consensual agreements which
permit the separated parties to adjust their tax status without a
prior court decree. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)3. As observed
in Mavity v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1965), if a husband can have the benefit of the deduction by a mere written
separation agreement, surely an invalid divorce should be sufficient when the husband and wife are in fact separated.
Soon after the principal case was decided the Tax Court was
again reversed. Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.
1965). Wondsel relied on the principal case. "We adopt the reasoning in Borax." The circuit court observed that the decree cannot
be said to lack validity completely even though held invalid by
the court of the marital domicile because it is a valid divorce in the
rendering jurisdiction of Florida.
Raymond Albert Hinerman

ABSTRACTS
Conflict of Laws-Statute of Limitations
P, a resident of Ohio, received personal injuries in an accident
in Virginia caused by the negligence of D, a resident of North
Carolina. P brought an action for personal injuries and for property
damage in a federal district court in North Carolina. The action
was brought more than two but fewer than three years after the
accident. The statute of limitations as to negligent torts was two
years in Virginia and three years in North Carolina. D contended
that the law of Virginia where the cause of action arose, the lex
loci delicti, should have been used rather than the law of North
Carolina, the lex fori; therefore, the action was barred by the Virginia statute of limitations. D's motion to dismiss was denied. Held,
affirmed. Where a claim arises in a state other than the state in
which the action is brought, the general rule is that the lex fori is
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